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Motivation 
1. On-line scams (pharmacy sales, phishing sites) 
continually evolve 
2. Most recently, using multiple levels/types of 
indirection (HTTP, DNS) 
3. Existing passive traffic analysis techniques rely on IP 
addresses, communication structure, redirection 
patterns, etc – can be evaded 
4. Traffic characteristics should be agnostic to evasion 
Current Research 
“RB-Seeker: Auto-detection of Redirection Botnets” 
•  Parsing wget logfiles on redirection 
•  Netflow information 
•  Short inter-flow duration, small flow size, short flow duration 
•  DNS log correlation 
•  Sequential Hypothesis Testing 
 
“BotMiner: Clustering Analysis of Network Traffic for Protocol and Structure 
Independent Botnet Detection” 
•  No prior knowledge of botnets 
•  Clustering C&C communication 
•  C-plane Monitor: Net flow, A-plane Monitor: outbound traffic  
•  C-plane Clustering: finding clusters in monitor logs 
 
“Behavioral Clustering of HTTP-Based Malware and Signature Generation 
Using Malicious Network Traces” 
•  Structural similarities between HTTP-based malware 
•  Automatically generating network signatures 
Facts 
Hypothesis 
1. Prior work finds significant redirection and traffic 
proxying by botnets 
2. Scam content hosted by bot CDNs and by countries 
with poor connectivity 
 
Transport-layer traffic analysis of intermediate and 
landing pages reveal poor connectivity? 
 
How connected are scam servers?  
Scam Connectivity “Quality” 
1. We’re agnostic to IP, DNS names, registrars, etc. 
2. Collect Transport-layer traffic features that reveal: 
•  Asymmetric bandwidth 
•  Busy bots and/or poorly connected hosts 
3. More detailed than NetFlow-style statistics: 
•  Retransmits (in/out) 
•  RSTs/FINs (in/out) 
•  Congestion Window (min, zero) 
•  3WHS and per-segment RTT variance 
•  Packet inter-arrival jitter 
 
NetFlow Vs SpamFlow 
NetFlow 
IP Destination Address 
IP Source Address 
Source Port 
Destination Port 
Layer 3 Protocol Type 
Class of Service 
Router or Switch Interface 
SpamFlow 
Timestamp of first packet observed in flow 
Number of packets from source and MTA 
TCP segment retransmission from source and MTA 
TCP reset segments from source and MTA 
TCP segments with FIN bit set, from source and MTA 
Number of times the congestion window went to zero 
Minimum congestion window over flow life 
Maximum flow idle time 
RTT of the TCP three-way handshake 
Inter-packet arrival variance 
Per-segment RTT variance 
Flow duration 
TCP SYN window size 
TCP SYN packet size 
Fragment IP Bit 
Arriving IP TTL 
Experiment 
• Web-crawl: Alexa Top 10K and 35K known-scam 
URLs from spam sink 
• Record transport layer information of each HTTP 
GET (including redirections): 
• Find statistical discriminators between scam and 
non-scam hosts 
Redirection Summary 
• Scam URLs = 23,762, 1.45 per 
• Non-Scam URLs = 3,075, 1.8 per 


































• Very different distributions (scam/non-scam) 
depending on redirection stage (initial, intermediate, 
terminal) 
• Confirms previous observations that bots perform 
redirection 
Transport-Layer Features 
First URL Intermediate URL Final URL 
Minimum Congestion Window over Flow Lifetime 
Estimated RTT Variance over Flow Lifetime 
First URL Intermediate URL Final URL 
Method Acc Sens Spec PPV NPV 
Bayes 0.760 0.715 0.808 0.795 0.731 
SVM 0.874 0.816 0.935 0.929 0.830 
Decision 
Tree 
0.937 0.943 0.931 0.934 0.940 
Classification 
• Using data with 50% “good”, 50% “scam”: 
Future Work (Flow Analysis) 
•  Cookies and cookie behavior for scam infrastructure 
•  PHP and JavaScript code injection redirection 
•  Probing from multiple locations 
•  P2P Hosts Vs Spam Hosts similarities / differences 
•  Detect human behavior simulations 
Future Work (Other) 
 
•  Use of legitimate in-line images 
•  Appearance of same URL / token across multiple 
emails/user 
•  URLs if Exif of jpgs 
•  Life of URLs 
